From the essay about Money : Debt And The Value Of Labor, we are pleased to decrease the volume into a sharp satire about the upcoming new contract for 1560 F-35s and the European efforts for GCAP and FCAS both comparable jet fighters. We hope you enjoy. The price tag is only $250Bn but Lockheed Martin has provided assurances that it will generate at least $79Bn of “economic activity” and lots of spare parts.
Special Thanks to Claude for Design Cleanup in Hangar 35.
Screwed If You Do, Screwed If You Don't
In Washington, no problem is so thoroughly broken that it cannot be fixed by paying the people who broke it to keep breaking it, on a ten-year subscription plan.
Consider the Pentagon's October 2026 victory lap: a landmark decade-long framework agreement with Lockheed Martin covering 1,560 F-35 Lightning II fighter jets, including a guaranteed floor of 850 airframes for the U.S. military. Congress hasn't passed the authorization. The appropriations don't exist. The price tag is "conveniently undisclosed," which in defense procurement means "emotionally unavailable."
It is the ultimate defense-industrial Catch-22. If Congress kills or stalls the deal, America's fighter fleet ages into obsolescence while adversaries mass-produce fifth- and sixth-generation interceptors. If Congress signs, taxpayers are locked into bankrolling a program whose crown jewels have already been looted, misplaced, or casually mail-ordered to Beijing.
And here is the part the press release does not mention: America is not paying alone. Roughly 710 of those jets are earmarked for some twenty other countries, most of them European. The Old Continent is not watching this farce from the balcony. It bought a ticket, bought a jet, and is standing in the same gift shop.
Act IThe World's Most Expensive Lost-and-Found
To appreciate the comedy of ordering 1,560 more of these jets, first admire how the Pentagon manages the ones it already owns. According to the Government Accountability Office, the Defense Department cannot reliably account for roughly 26 million F-35 spare parts valued at $31 billion, scattered across more than 700 facilities worldwide. Over a million parts vanished during a five-year stretch, worth over $85 million, and as of March 2026 the program office still had no idea what happened to them, because the inventory spreadsheets belong to the contractors, not to the government that bought the contents.
The details get better. Some 17,000 parts worth about $1.3 billion were never entered into the logistics system at all. In one contractor submission, fewer than a third of the records included a serial number, and nearly 6% of parts carried an acquisition cost of one penny or less, which the GAO delicately called "a possible data quality error" and everyone else would call "the spreadsheet has given up." The Pentagon has spent at least $17 million since 2020 counting its own parts, an audit that confirmed only that counting is hard.
Meanwhile, roughly three-quarters of the existing U.S. F-35 fleet wasn't fully mission capable in fiscal 2025. So naturally, the solution to being unable to track or maintain the planes we have is to order 156 brand-new ones every single year through 2036.
Act IIComplimentary Shipping to Hong Kong
Of course, "missing" parts don't just evaporate. Sometimes they take an unscheduled vacation.
Just weeks before the mega-deal was announced, Congress launched an investigation into how a damaged Australian F-35 cockpit canopy and weapons-bay door, both coated with radar-absorbing material, bound for repair in the United States, ended up in Hong Kong, in Chinese custody, where they remain. The full mechanics of this heist deserve their own museum wing: a freight forwarder emailed a warning that U.S. export rules barred the shipment from transiting certain countries. A UPS employee missed the email. To save time, the shipment was rerouted through Hong Kong anyway.
To save time. Not espionage. Not a cyberattack. A scheduling optimization. The most sophisticated stealth aircraft ever built, undone by an unread message sitting in the wrong inbox.
Defense officials rushed to reassure everyone that a single canopy doesn't give away the whole airplane. Sure. Beijing certainly didn't already hold terabytes of stolen blueprints from two decades of cyber-espionage, and a physical sample of the F-35's radar-absorbent coating and low-observable edge geometry wouldn't possibly help Chinese engineers validate their models, study how stealth coatings degrade, and calibrate radars to find the jet from a hundred miles out.
By the time the 1,560th jet rolls off the line in the mid-2030s, China won't just have clones. It will have spent twenty years perfecting the counter-stealth kill chains designed to swat the F-35 out of the Pacific, using a manual FedEx'd to them by accident.
Act IIIMeanwhile, in Europe: The Loyal Customers
Now cross the Atlantic, where twenty governments, a dozen-plus of them European, are preparing to take delivery of the other 710 jets. Europe has watched every act of this comedy, and its response has been to order more tickets.
Start with the arithmetic nobody in a European defense ministry says out loud: the 156-jets-a-year production rate only works because Europe keeps ordering. Those 710 airframes are not a favor to NATO; they are the volume discount that keeps the Fort Worth line humming. Every European procurement official sighing over unit costs is also a co-signer on the American invoice.
Then consider what, exactly, Europe is buying. The F-35's mission data files, the electronic maps of enemy radars that make the stealth meaningful, are compiled and updated in the United States. The logistics system that grounds or flies the fleet is run by the prime contractor. In 2025, Washington simply paused deliveries over a software upgrade while allied air forces waited, engines unbought, sovereignty deferred. Europe has purchased the world's most advanced fighter jet and is renting the permission slip to use it, billed monthly, renewable at the pleasure of a Congress that hasn't passed the appropriations.
The spare parts are a shared joke too. That $31 billion untracked inventory is a joint pool, American, European, and allied parts mingling in the same 700 warehouses that no spreadsheet can find. When a Norwegian tire or a Dutch engine module goes missing, it goes missing in the same system that lost a million American parts. And after Hong Kong, every European logistician now knows that their stealth components travel the same commercial freight routes, guarded by the same missed emails. The lost-and-found is international. Solidarity at last.
Act IVEurope Builds Its Own Trap. Twice. Then One Collapses.
Why does Europe keep buying? Two reasons, both embarrassing.
First, the trap is hereditary. Germany didn't choose the F-35 so much as the F-35 was the only aircraft certified to carry America's B61 nuclear bombs under NATO's nuclear-sharing arrangements. Berlin's air deterrence is a leased feature of someone else's arsenal, and the subscription only runs on one airframe.
Second, there is the homegrown alternative, and here the story earns its own act. Europe's plan to escape dependency on one American jet was to spend a few hundred billion euros building two European sixth-generation jets, and then argue over whose flag goes on the tail. It has gone precisely as well as you would expect.
FCAS, the Franco-German-Spanish program, collapsed in June 2026 after Dassault and Airbus spent nine years conducting what was less a joint development than a custody battle over a child neither had finished drawing. The disputed assets: who is in charge, who owns the ideas, and who signs the drawings. The settlement: nobody. France walked off to build its own jet with the French state, Germany was left holding a Typhoon-sized problem and a March 2027 deadline, and the only sixth-generation technology FCAS ever reliably produced was litigation.
Enter Britain, playing the gracious host. Prime Minister Burnham publicly declared himself open to Germany joining GCAP, the UK-Italy-Japan program, during a visit to Berlin. Italy and Japan reacted the way homeowners react when a relative mentions moving in: nervously, and then with an offer. Rome proposed "observer status," a diplomatic construction meaning Germany may watch the jet being designed but may not touch the pencil. Rome insists this is not a rejection, merely a fast track to eventual full membership, which raises the question of what the slow track looks like. A German official called the offer "unacceptable," a rare moment of Franco-German agreement achieved entirely without France's participation.
So there it is. The American jet has a spare parts problem, a shipping problem, and a Congress problem. The European alternative has two programs, one lawsuit, one guest who is only allowed in the hallway, and a delivery date of 2035 that everyone involved pronounces with the confidence of a man reading his own horoscope. "Strategic autonomy" remains the most expensive phrase in the European lexicon, a phrase that, like the F-35's spare parts, exists in the records but cannot currently be located.
Act VThe Human Price Tag in the Cockpit
Then there are the people actually strapped into the ejection seats. The pilots flying these jets aren't stupid. They read the news. They see the hangar queens grounded for lack of parts, and they know the "invisible" cloak they fly behind has been examined under a microscope in Shenzhen, with a physical sample for reference.
Over the next decade, to crew 850 new U.S. airframes, the military must recruit, screen, and train at least 850 new pilots, not counting replacements for the experienced aviators who punch out to the airlines the moment their commitment expires, a form of retention that the commercial boarding pass has proven better at preventing than the Pentagon has.
And that pipeline carries its own quietly ignored bill:
- Over $10 billion in tuition alone. By RAND Corporation analyses adjusted for inflation, turning one recruit into a basic-qualified F-35A pilot costs roughly $12.3 million. Multiplied across 850 airframes, that is $10.4 billion just to get rookie wingmen through the door, before a single one becomes combat-ready.
- A $40,000-an-hour meter. Every training hour in the air costs taxpayers roughly $34,000 to $42,000, flown while wearing a custom laser-scanned helmet priced at $400,000: a helmet that costs more than the apartment the pilot will never afford, scanning for threats that have already read the jet's mail.
- Training for yesterday's war. Those pilots will spend years in simulators practicing tactics built around stealth superiority that may be compromised on arrival, learning first-day material the adversary has been studying for a semester.
CurtainThe Verdict
That is the trap, and it now spans an ocean. Walk away, and America is left with a shrinking, broken fleet and a hollowed-out industrial base, while Europe is left with a fighter it cannot service, data files it cannot update, and a nuclear mission it cannot perform. Approve it, and two continents lock in a quarter-trillion-dollar wager (airframes, engines, sustainment, and $10 billion in pilot training) on a 2000s-era stealth design whose secrets were shipped to the adversary via commercial freight, with a tracking number.
Either way, Lockheed Martin gets its backlog. Beijing gets its reference samples. Europe gets its dependency, with a delivery date and a subscription fee. Congress gets its Catch-22, Brussels gets its mirror image, and the taxpayer, on both sides of the Atlantic, gets the invoice: printed in Fort Worth, shipped via Hong Kong, and filed in the world's most expensive lost-and-found.
The Final Invoice: 1,560 F-35s, Ten Years, No Surprises (Except All of Them)
Back-of-envelope: blended A/B/C flyaway of roughly $85 million per airframe, plus the decade of everything else. Figures rounded, because the Pentagon rounds too, just less honestly.
| Line item | Cost (USD) |
|---|---|
| 1,560 airframes at ~$85M blended flyaway (incl. engines) | ~$132.6 B |
| Pilot pipeline: 850+ new U.S. pilots at ~$12.3M each | ~$10.4 B |
| Ten years of sustainment, modification kits, and spares | ~$100 B |
| Expected final bill, decade total | ~$243 billion |
| All-in cost per jet, once you include everything | ~$156 M |
What the Same Money Buys in Drones Not Yet Compromised by Tech Transfer
Emphasis on yet. The moment these enter service, see Act II.
| Drone class | Unit cost | Qty for $243B |
|---|---|---|
| CCA-class loyal wingman drones | ~$30 M | ~8,100 |
| Advanced attritable strike drones | ~$10 M | ~24,300 |
| Cheap attritable strike drones | ~$5 M | ~48,600 |
| Loitering munitions | ~$1 M | ~243,000 |
"What has not yet been compromised... perhaps we should build only the F-35s. At least we know our exposure."
A Note on Tech Transfers (The Greatest Hits)
- Su Bin case (2010-2016): PLA-linked hackers exfiltrated ~65 GB of C-17 data plus F-22 and F-35 material from Boeing and Lockheed contractor networks. C-17 production ended in 2015; the data outlived the line.
- Navy contractor breach (2018): 600+ GB stolen, including the then-secret Sea Dragon anti-ship missile program and undersea warfare signals material.
- THAAD and Patriot data (2017): missile-defense documents lifted through a U.S. contractor's network.
- Loral & Hughes (1995-2002): U.S. firms helped China diagnose Long March rocket failures, transferring guidance expertise that U.S. intelligence assessed improved Chinese ICBMs. $32 million in State Department fines; no spies, just consultants.
- The Israel backdoor: the cancelled, U.S.-funded Lavi followed by persistent allegations of its design legacy in the J-10; the Phalcon AWACS sale killed by Washington in 2000; the Harpy upgrade dispute of 2004.
- Australia as the unlocked window: ASIO headquarters blueprints stolen (2013); 30 GB on F-35, F/A-18, P-8 and C-130 lifted from an Australian defense subcontractor (2016).
- German MTU diesels: engines powering Chinese submarine designs surfaced in Thailand's S26T order, blocked only when Berlin embargoed them in 2022. The 1989 EU embargo, honored in the catalog, evaded in the supply chain.
- The Hong Kong special (2026): an Australian F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door, rerouted to save time by a missed email, now in Chinese custody. The most modern transfer of all, and the only one with a tracking number.
- Honorable mention, the classics: KGB collection against Concorde feeding the Tu-144; the Space Shuttle's alleged fingerprints on Buran; the F-117's Serbian wreckage reportedly visited by Chinese collectors; and the 1958 Sidewinder that failed to explode, lodged in a MiG-17, and became the K-13. Sometimes the freight company is the enemy's best asset.
Roll the Tape (Video Coverage)
Embedded coverage of the Hong Kong special. If the frames show blank in your blog editor's preview, they will still play on the published page.
Sources
- Pentagon-Lockheed 10-year framework, 1,560 jets / 850 U.S. floor / 156 per year: Defense News, Breaking Defense, Air & Space Forces Magazine, Lockheed Martin.
- GAO on 26 million parts / $31 billion / 700+ facilities / $85M in losses: GAO-27-108713, Defense News, The Aviationist, Military.com.
- Hong Kong diversion of the Australian F-35 canopy and weapons-bay door: ABC News (Australia), Al Jazeera, The Straits Times, MiGFlug (the missed email).
- FCAS collapse, June 2026 (Dassault-Airbus dispute): Air Data News, AFP.
- Germany's GCAP courtship, Italy's "observer status," the "unacceptable" verdict, March 2027 deadline: Clash Report (via FT), Global Defense Corp, MiGFlug, AFP.
- Pilot training cost basis: RAND Corporation analyses, adjusted for inflation, ~$12.3M per basic-qualified F-35A pilot.